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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-appeal
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, and Rule
3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The trial court exercised permissible discretion in exercising its

equitable powers in offsetting the present value of Carolyn's Social Security benefits
against the value of other marital assets.
Standard of Review.

A trial court has considerable discretion

concerning property division in a divorce proceeding, and its actions enjoy a
presumption of validity which will not be disturbed unless clearly unjust or clearly an
abuse of discretion. Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176 (Utah App. 2002), Walters v.
Walters. 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991).
Issue Preserved. This point is in Mark's capacity as Appellee, and as
such, Carolyn has preserved the issue. See, Brief of Appellant, Page 1, Statement
of the Issues, No. 1. In addition, Mark filed a Trial Memorandum on the Social
Security retirement issue, R. at p. 301-307.
2.

Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in basing its alimony award,

in significant part, by including within its determination of her monthly needs, the cost
of maintaining health insurance coverage for the parties' two adult children?
Standard of Review. A question of law is reviewed for correctness,
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affording no deference to the trial court's ruling. Toone v. Toone. 952 P.2d 112
(Utah App. 1998).
Issue Preserved. Transcript, Volume I of III, Pages 216-221, R. at p.
498; Transcript, Volume III of III, Page 731, R. at p. 500 (Mark's counsel's closing
argument).
3.

Did the trial court exceed the scope of its permissible discretion, in

denying Mark's Motion for New Trial on the alimony issue, because of newly
discovered evidence?
Standard of Review. The denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed
upon an "abuse of discretion" standard. State of Utah, in the Interest of J.P.. 921
P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1996).
Issue Preserved. Notice of Appeal. R. pp. 489-490
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves cross-appeals in a divorce action. Carolyn Olsen filed for
divorce against Mark Olsen on December 11, 2003. A bench trial was held before
the Honorable Scott M. Hadley, District Judge, on March 14 and 18, and April 4,
2005.
Judge Hadley ruled, based upon expert testimony, that the present value of
Carolyn's Social Security retirement benefits was $115,434.

The expert also

testified that the present value of Carolyn's Utah State Retirement teacher's pension
was $479,121.77, and that the present value of Mark's civil service retirement
2

pension was $897,804.70.
Judge Hadley also ruled that Carolyn should be awarded $862 per month
alimony, based in significant part by including within Carolyn's reasonable monthly
needs budget, a $556.59 per month health insurance premium that covered Carolyn
and the parties' two adult, emancipated sons.
A Judgment and Decree of Divorce was entered on January 9, 2006. On
January 18, 2006, Mark filed a Motion for New Trial on the alimony issue. Judge
Hadley entered an Order Denying Respondent's Motion for New Trial on June 20,
2006.
Carolyn filed her Notice of Appeal on July 19,2006, and Mark filed his Notice
of Appeal as cross-appellant on August 2, 2006.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Mark and Carolyn Olsen were married on May 5,1978 in Eden, Weber

County, Utah. R. p. 1.
2.

During the entirety of the parties' marriage, Carolyn was employed as

a school teacher for the Weber County School District, R. p. 2, and Mark was a
federal civil service employee at Hill Air Force Base, R. p. 2.
3.

During their marriage, Carolyn acquired both a defined benefit and

defined contribution retirement plan with the Utah State Retirement System.
R. p. 3
4.

Similarly, during their marriage, Mark acquired both a defined benefit
3

and defined contribution plan through the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS).
R. p. 3
5.

Carolyn also participates in the federal Social Security System,

contributing $216.03 per month from her paycheck. Tr. pp. 40-41; R. p. 498.
6.

Mark does not participate in the Social Security System, because he is

in the federal Civil Service Retirement System. Tr. pp. 394-395; 397; R. p. 499; Trial
Exhibits R-5 (Mark's CSRS Benefit Estimate Report) and R-6 (Mark's Civilian Leave
and Earnings Statement), and any eligibility for Social Security by Mark would have
resulted in a commensurate decrease in his CSRS pension annuity, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 8349 (Addendum A, this Brief).
7.

Mark contributes approximately $610 per month out of his paycheck into

the CSRS defined benefit retirement plan. Tr. p. 557, II. 3-15; R. p. 500; Trial Exhibit
R-6.
8.

Brent Griffiths, CPA, testified as an expert witness in accounting and

present value calculation of future streams of income. Tr. p. 321, R. p. 499.
9.

Mr. Griffiths testified as to the present value of both parties' defined

benefit retirement plans and Carolyn's Social Security benefits. Tr. pp. 322-325, R.
p. 499. He testified that future Social Security benefits, as well as future Utah State
Teacher's Retirement monthly payments and future Federal Civil Service Retirement
monthly payments, are all annuities within the meaning of Revenue Ruling 205-13.
Tr. pp. 325-326, R. p. 499.
4

10.

Through Mr. Griffiths' testimony, a two page exhibit, Trial Exhibit R-22,

was introduced. Exhibit R-22 calculated the present value of Mark's CSRS pension
as $897,804.70; of Carolyn's Utah State Retirement System teacher's pension as
$479,121.77; and of Carolyn's Social Security benefits to be $115,435.24 (Page 2
of Trial Exhibit R-22) (Addendum A, this Brief). The Social Security benefit present
value was arrived at ultimately after Judge Hadley asked Mr. Griffiths to make certain
adjustments. Tr. pp. 335-342, R. p. 499.
11.

Mr. Griffiths also testified that $53,196 had come out of Carolyn's

paychecks and paid into the Social Security System. Tr. p. 324, R. p. 499; Carolyn's
Trial Exhibit P-1.
12.

The parties also each had a defined contribution retirement plan.

Carolyn's was a 401 (k) plan with a value of $119,519.53 as of December 31, 2003
when Mark stopped contributing to his defined contribution plan designated as a
Thrift Savings Plan. Finding of Fact No. 74, R. p. 377 (Addendum C, this Brief). The
trial court valued Mark's TSP at $93,639 as of December 31, 2003. Finding of Fact
No. 75, R. p. 377.
13.

Judge Hadley's Findings of Fact on the parties' retirement accounts are

found in Findings of Fact Nos. 68-76, R. pp. 376-377, and can be summarized as
follows: That the parties had essentially five retirement plans; that during the
marriage Carolyn contributed to Social Security and Mark did not; that federal law
prohibited the direct division of Carolyn's Social Security benefits; that the best way
5

to divide Mark's CSRS pension and Carolyn's Utah State Retirement teacher's
pension was by the Woodward formula, with each party receiving one-half of the
benefits acquired during their marriage.
14.

The trial court concluded that Carolyn's Social Security benefits were

valued at $115,435.24, Finding of Fact No. 72, R. p. 376, and concluded that, since
there is no established controlling law, they were a marital asset. Conclusion of Law
No. 14, R. p. 391.
15.

Both parties briefed the Social Security issue for the trial court. R. pp.

258-284 (Carolyn's Trial Memorandum and supporting cases); R. pp. 301-307
(Mark's Trial Memorandum)
16.

The trial court ordered Carolyn to pay Mark $9,421.50 to equalize part

of the parties' marital assets, which included valuing Carolyn's Social Security, but
did not include either Carolyn's or Mark's defined benefit pensions. Conclusions of
Law Nos. 20-22, R. pp. 392-393. This equalization of part of the parties' assets also
did not include the almost $275,000 in house equity which was divided equaiiy.
Findings of Fact Nos. 29 and 31, R. pp. 370-371, Conclusions of Law Nos. 6, R. p.
389 and 8-10, R. p. 390.
17.

At the parties' temporary order hearing on February 5,2004, Mark was

ordered to pay Carolyn $465 per month temporary alimony. Finding of Fact No. 8,
R. p. 367.
18.

The temporary alimony award was premised, in part, on Carolyn's
6

providing family insurance coverage including covering the parties' then minor child
Jesse, born November 27, 1986. R. p. 1 (Jessie's birth date)
19.

At trial, Carolyn testified, on cross-examination, that her health

insurance premium had gone from $308.80 per month (for family coverage) to
$556.59 per month, and that covered herself and the parties' by then two
emancipated adult sons, Jesse having turned 18 on November 27, 2004,
approximately four months prior to the trial. Tr. pp. 217-219, R. p. 498. Carolyn did
not know how much the premium would be just to cover herself. Tr. p. 219, R. p.
498. Her alimony request was premised on the health insurance premium figure of
$556.59 per month, as part of her reasonable needs. Tr. pp. 220-221, R. p. 498
20.

The trial court found that Carolyn's $556.59 per month out-of-pocket

health insurance premium was reasonable, and was part of the standard of living of
the parties. Findings of Fact Nos. 105-109, R. pp. 382-383. The trial court found
that this $556.59 per month figure was, dollar-for-dollar, part of Carolyn's monthly
living expenses necessary to maintain her standard of living to which she had grown
accustomed, Finding of Fact No. 118, R. p. 385, and that her monthly shortfall was
$862, Finding of Fact No. 123, R. pp. 385-386. This led directly to the court's
alimony award of $862 per month. Conclusion of Law No. 27, R. p. 394.
21.

At trial, respondent's counsel questioned Carolyn concerning the

appropriateness of considering expenses for other adults as part of her personal
needs. Tr. pp. 220-21, R. p. 498, and argued, in closing argument, that it was
7

inappropriate to do so. Tr. p. 731, R. p. 500.
22.

The Judgment and Decree of Divorce was entered January 9, 2006.

R. p. 358
23.

On January 18,2006, Mark filed a Motion for New Trial and To Alter or

Amend That Part of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce Which Awards Petitioner
$862 Per Month Alimony, pursuant to Rule 7 and 59(a)(4) and (e), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeking a reduction of alimony from $862 per month to $362 per
month. R. p. 398.
24.

In his Supporting Affidavit, R. pp. 400-404 (plus attached exhibits), Mark

alleged that historically Carolyn had, in consultation with Mark, provided family health
insurance coverage because the Weber County School Board paid for it; that at the
time of the temporary order hearing during the pendency of the divorce, she was not
out-of-pocket for this coverage; that during the pendency of the proceedings, and
unilaterally and without consulting Mark, Carolyn opted for a policy during the 20042005 school year oniy, which cosi her $556.59 per month, the increased cost of
which she did not even attempt to have him share, because he could have provided
coverage through his employment much less expensively; and that, as of October
1,2005, after the trial but more than three months before entry of the Judgment and
Decree of Divorce, Carolyn's out-of-pocket health insurance had gone from $556.59
per month to $74.66 per month. Mark's Supplement to His Motion for New Trial,
etc., and attached Exhibit A, R. p. 409. The parties briefed this issue. R. pp. 4058

408 (Mark's Memorandum); R. pp. 413-414 (Carolyn's Objection to Mark's Motion),
R. pp. 431-436 (Carolyn's Memorandum); R. pp. 437-439 (Carolyn's Affidavit); R. pp.
452-456 (Mark's Reply Memorandum).
25.

Judge Hadley issued an Order Denying Respondent's Motion for New

Trial, entered June 21,2006, ruling that InreJ.P.. 921 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1996),
contained special circumstances for Rule 59 motions that did not apply to Mark's
motion.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Social Security Issue.

Utah's trial courts have considerable

discretion concerning property division in divorce proceedings, and may consider all
relevant circumstances. Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). Considering the
present value of Carolyn's Social Security benefits under the rather unique
circumstances of this case, is within the proper exercise of this discretion. Those
circumstances include the facts that both Carolyn and Mark contributed out of their
paychecks into federal statutory retirement systems - Carolyn into Social Security
and Mark into CSRS. Carolyn receives a full Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431
(Utah 1982) (hereinafter Woodward) share of Mark's CSRS. The $53,196 coming
out of Carolyn's paycheck into Social Security could have been invested in a private
retirement plan, and there would be no argument that it was divisible by the trial
court.
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Contrary to Carolyn's argument, Congress has not preempted state courts
from considering Social Security benefits in dividing marital assets. Rather, 42
U.S.C. Section 407(a) prohibits only the direct division of Social Security benefits,
and does not prohibit a court from considering them in fashioning an equitable
distribution of marital property.
Nothing in Judge Hadley's order even remotely affects Carolyn's future
receipt of Social Security benefits. If she lives to the appropriate age, she receives
them in full.

Carolyn's claim that her future receipt of these benefits is too

speculative and contingent is not a compelling argument. Personal injury cases
routinely involve the present valuing of future income streams dependent upon the
same actuarial assumptions.
Appellate courts from Ohio, Massachusetts, Kansas, Iowa, Missouri,
Maine; Arizona, and Pennsylvania have all held that trial courts may, in various
ways, take into account Social Security benefits in equitably apportioning marital
property, but may not directly divide them. See, e.g., Neviiie v. Neviiie, 99 Ohio
St.3d 275,791 N.E.2d 434 (2003) (approving awarding to appellant of marital house
equity as explicitly balancing value of appellee's Social Security benefits).
Carolyn's citation to the language of footnote 2 in Jeffries v. Jeffries. 895
P.2d 835 (Utah App. 1995), which footnote 2 cites Flemminq v. Nestor. 363 U.S. 603
(1960) is not compelling. The Jeffries court did not actually reach the issue of
whether Social Security benefits are marital property and thus footnote 2 is non10

binding dicta. In addition, Flemming v. Nestor held only that that portion of the
Social Security Act which divested a deported alien of Social Security benefits did
not deprive him of a vested property right. This is different than saying a court may
not even consider Carolyn's benefits in the overall equitable distribution. It may be
that Judge Hadley used the wrong terminology in holding that they were marital
property, but he could consider their value in his overall distribution.
2.

The Alimony Issue. Carolyn's standard of living, during the parties'

marriage, never included providing health insurance coverage for adult children.
Sections 78-45-3 and 4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, impose on parents a
legal obligation to support their children, defined in Section 78-45-2(6) as minors.
Providing health insurance and medical care is part of supporting a minor child, just
as is clothing and educating a child. There is no legal obligation to provide support
of any kind for an emancipated child. If there were, courts would be able to order
divorcing parents to pay for college and post-graduate education. Thus, the trial
court, as a matter of law, erred in ruling that Carolyn's standard of living included
providing health insurance coverage for adult children.
Carolyn historically paid very little out-of-pocket for the family health
insurance. When she unilaterally changed the coverage during the pendency of the
proceedings, resulting in a much higher premium, Mark was unaware. Then, three
months before the Decree was even entered, but after the trial court ruled that the
$556.59 per month family premium was part of Carolyn's personal standard of living,
11

Carolyn reduced the premium to approximately $75 per month. Divorces are
equitable proceedings, and to compel Mark to file a petition to modify alimony when
the changed circumstances occurred months before the Decree was signed,
frustrates judicial economy. In addition, the trial court should have found that this
case presented special circumstances analogous to those of In re J.P.. 921 P.2d
1012 (Utah App. 1996).
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
EXERCISING ITS EQUITABLE DISCRETION BY
OFFSETTING THE VALUE OF SOCIAL SECURITY
BENEFITS AGAINST OTHER MARITAL ASSETS, AS NO
HARM WAS DONE TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM AND AN EQUITABLE RESULT WAS
ACHIEVED.
Utah's trial courts have considerable discretion concerning property division
in divorce proceedings, and may consider all relevant circumstances. Burke v.
Burke. 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). Where the circumstances are unique, the trial
court may reaiiocate separate property to achieve an equitabie resuit. Elman v.
Elman, 45 P.3d 176 (Utah App. 2003); Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App.
1991).

Considering the present value of Carolyn's Social Security benefits

constitutes just such unique circumstances under the facts of this case.
Carolyn's citation to Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo. 439 U.S. 572, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59
L.Ed.2d 1 (1979), involving railroad retirement benefits, and McCarty v. McCartv. 453
U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), involving military retirement
12

benefits is inapposite. In both Hisquierdo and McCarty. divorce trial courts tried to
divide directly federal benefits that were statutorily exempted from such a division.
In the present case, Judge Hadley attempted no such division, which Mark
acknowledges would be an improper interference with the Social Security system.
Rather, Judge Hadley recognized the inherent inequity in allowing Carolyn a full
Woodward portion of all of Mark's retirements, but excluding Mark from any
consideration regarding Carolyn's - despite the fact that $53,196 had come out of
Carolyn's marital earnings, and that Carolyn will receive her full Social Security
benefit at retirement.
It is submitted that the Social Security Act's 42 U.S.C. Section 407(a)
provision (see Addendum in Brief of Appellant) has not preempted state divorce
courts from an equitable consideration of the value of Social Security benefits in
dividing marital assets, but, rather, prohibits only their direct division. Appellate
courts from Ohio, Massachusetts, Kansas, Iowa, Maine, Arizona, and Pennsylvania
have a!! so held.
In Neville v. Neville. 99 Ohio St.3d 275, 791 N.E.2d 434 (2003), the trial court
adopted the magistrate's recommendations that the present value of each spouse's
Social Security benefits could be considered when dividing marital property.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the trial court. The Neville court first
discussed 42 U.S.C. Section 407(a)'s provision that prohibits any transfer or
assignment of Social Security benefits, and, "...in general protects these benefits
13

from 'execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process"'. Neville. 791
N.E.2d 434, at 436. The court then discussed Hisquierdo. McCarty. and Mansell v.
Mansell. 490 U.S. 581 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989) (involving military
disability benefits), and stated:
In Hoyt v. Hoyt [citation omitted], we therefore held
that Social Security benefits themselves are not subject to
division in a divorce proceeding. The question remains
whether a trial court may consider Social Security benefits
at all when dividing property in a divorce proceeding. The
courts that have addressed this issue have taken
divergent positions. 791 N.E.2d 434 at 436.
The Neville court then sets forth the various positions, including that a court
cannot even consider the value of Social Security benefits; that they may be
considered only when compared to other retirement benefits, or, more specifically,
other defined benefit retirement benefits; or that a trial court may consider the value
of such benefits as one factor in the overall scheme when making a property
division. The Ohio Supreme Court then held:
We believe that allowing consideration of Social
Security benefits in relation to all marital assets is the
more reasoned approach...Although a party's Social
Security benefits cannot be divided as a marital asset,
those benefits may be considered by the trial court under
the catchall category as a relevant and equitable factor in
making an equitable distribution. Accordingly, we hold
that a trial court, in seeking to make an equitable
distribution of marital property, may consider the parties'
future Social Security benefits in relation to all marital
assets. 791 P.2d 434 at 437.
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The following courts of other jurisdictions have taken the value of Social
Security benefits into account in dividing marital assets: Mahonev v. Mahoney. 425
Mass. 441, 681 N.E.2d 852 (1997) (considering Social Security benefits along with
other factors in determining equitable division of marital assets); In re Marriage of
Knipp. 15 Kan. App.2d 494, 800 P.2d 562 (1991) (Social Security benefits not
subject to division directly, but anti-assignment clause in Social Security Act does
not prohibit a court from considering the value of those benefits in the division of
remaining marital property); see also for Kansas, In re Marriage of Brane. 21 Kan.
App.2d 778, 908 P.2d 625 (1995) (wife awarded larger portion of pension in order
to equalize disparity in Social Security benefits); Bover v. Boyer. 538 N.W.2d 293
(Iowa 1995) (balancing specific present values of Social Security benefits in making
an overall property division); Rudden v. Rudden. 765 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. App. 1989)
(considering value of Social Security benefits as one of many economic factors in
property and alimony awards); Pongonis v. Pongonis. 606 A.2d 1055 (Maine 1992)
(as state employee, husband did not contribute to Social Security System; disparity
of Social Security benefits could be considered, so that where the combination of the
value of wife's Social Security and Kennebec Valley Medical Center retirement plan
approximated the value of husband's state retirement, proper for court to award each
party that party's respective retirement benefits [which was basically a dollar-fordollar offset]); Cornbleth v. Cornbleth, 397 Pa.Super. 421, 580 A.2d 369 (1990) (to
facilitate the process of equating CSRS participants and Social Security participants,
15

court approved the present value of a Social Security benefit, as if the CSRS
participant had been participating in the Social Security System, and then deducting
it from the present value of the CSRS pension).
In KeJly v. Kelly. 198 Ariz. 307, 9 P.3d 1046 (2000), husband's entire CSRS
pension was treated as a marital asset by the trial court, while only wife's non-Social
Security was so treated. The Arizona Supreme Court adopted the same approach
as the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Kelly v. Kelly, supra, and observed:
Viewed another way, it can be seen that in the
absence of social security contributions, the [marital]
community could have spent, saved, or invested those
funds as it saw fit. In each instance the resulting asset, if
any, would have been divisible as community property.
But, as matters presently stand, community funds have
been diverted to the separate benefit of one spouse. We
believe this situation compels an equitable response.
9P.3d1046at1048.
Carolyn's citation to Jeffries v. Jeffries. 895 P.2d 835 (Utah App. 1995), and
its footnote 2 reference to Flemminq v. Nestor. 363 U.S. 603 (1960) is not
persuasive. Jeffries involved a 401(a) plan, and this court acknowledged that
because "...the consideration of expected Social Security benefits as marital assets
is not directly at issue in this case, it is unnecessary for us to reach this question."
895 P.2d 836 at 838, fn. 2. (citing to language in Flemminq v. Nestor).
But Fleming v. Nestor involved a different issue, to-wit: it held only that that
portion of the Social Security Act which divested a deported alien of Social Security
benefits did not deprive him of a vested, due process property right. 363 U.S. 603,
16

at 610-611. In so holding, all the United States Supreme Court did was uphold a
section of the Social Security Act which said in effect, if you work here as a resident
alien, and then are deported, you forfeit the funds you paid into Social Security. The
Flemminq court did not deal with any issue of equitable offset of simply the value of
Social Security funds a recipient will get. It is submitted that this court's language
in footnote 2 of Jeffries is dicta, because this court was not called upon to actually
rule on that issue.
Counsel could find only one Utah case that came at all close to the present
issue. In Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah App. 1994), a child support and
visitation expense modification case, one of the issues was whether Section 78-457.5(8)(b), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, conflicted with 42 U.S.C. Section
407(a), quoted above (the anti-alienation clause of the Social Security Act). Section
78-45-7.5(8)(b) provides:
Social security benefits received by a child due to
the earnings of a parent may be credited as child support
to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that
parent.
In Brooks, the mother argued that 42 U.S.C. Section 407(a) prohibits any sort
of credit towards the father's child support obligations. Rejecting this position, this
court held:
...That is too broad a reading of section 407 and is wholly
inconsistent with Utah law [citation to statute
omitted]...Rather, the correct reading of section 407 is that
17

it prevents the trial court from ordering that the benefits
received on Michelle's behalf be spent for some particular
purpose. In other words, the court may not subject those
benefits to any "legal process" (citations omitted). 881
P.2d 955 at 961 (italics original)
While not involving exactly the same issue, as in the present case, the Brooks case
does allow an offset/credit for Social Security benefits against Mr. Brooks'
independent child support obligation. It should also be noted that Mr. Brooks'
income was a pension of $2,336.97 per month, plus $697 per month Social Security
disability benefits. The offset/credit he received against his child support obligation
was for a separate auxiliary Social Security benefit paid to his child.
Finally, as to Carolyn's argument that Social Security benefits are not really
"property" at all, whether marital or nonmarital, because Congress can, at least in
theory, abolish the Social Security System, Mark has two responses. First, it strains
credulity to think that Congress would actually abolish Social Security. Second, in
the extremely unlikely circumstance that Congress did so, Carolyn could ask the trial
court to modify its decision, pursuant to Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated, as
amended. Far and away, the most likely scenario is that Carolyn will live to Social
Security retirement age and collect those benefits.
Thus, Utah courts have broad equitable jurisdiction to consider the present
value of Social Security benefits in dividing property incident to a decree of divorce.
Numerous other states have so held, and no holding in existing Utah case law
prohibits this. It is also submitted that, under the unique facts of this case, where
18

Mark does not participate in Social Security, it was a permissible equitable result.
POINT II. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED WHEN IT INCLUDED THE COST OF
MAINTAINING HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
THE PARTIES' TWO ADULT CHILDREN WITHIN
CAROLYN'S ESTABLISHED STANDARD OF LIVING
FOR HERSELF.
Section 30-3-5(8)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, mandates a
divorce court to consider "the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse"
(emphasis added) in determining alimony, and Section 30-3-5(8)(c) directs the court
to look to the standard of living of the parties. Carolyn's standard of living, never
really included providing health insurance coverage for adult children. Sections 7845-3 and 4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, impose upon parents a legal
obligation to support their children, defined in Section 78-45-2(6) as minors under
the age of 18. Providing health insurance and medical care for minor children is part
of supporting a minor child, just as is clothing, educating, music lessons, sports,
shelter, etc. There is no legal obligation to provide support of any kind for an adult,
emancipated child.

If there were, courts would become involved in ordering

divorcing parents to pay for college and post-graduate education, athletics and
artistic endeavors, and other things of this nature. There is a legally imposed
obligation to support minors. There is no such obligation to support adult children,
and the trial court erred in considering Carolyn's $556.59 per month family premium
which was higher by several hundred dollars than the premium for just insuring
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herself, as part of the needs of the recipient spouse, Section 78-45-7.5(8)(a)(i). This
part of the case should be reversed and remanded for entry of an alimony award that
reflects consideration of the amount of Carolyn's health insurance premium alone.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED THE SCOPE
OF ITS PERMISSIBLE DISCRETION IN DENYING
MARK'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED,
JUSTIFYING THE RELAXING OF THE NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT.
Mark filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(4), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which allows a trial court discretion to grant a new trial based upon
"...[n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which
he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial."
A trial court's ruling in this regard is upon an "abuse of discretion" standard. State
of Utah in the Interest of J.P.. 921 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1996)
The basic facts, as set forth in Mark's supporting Affidavit for the new trial
motion (plus attached exhibits) were as follows:

historically, Carolyn had, in

consultation with Mark, provided the family coverage health insurance because the
Weber County School Board paid for it; that at the time of the temporary order
hearing on February 5, 2004 held early on during the pendency of the divorce,
Carolyn was not out-of-pocket very much for this coverage; that during the
subsequent pendency of the proceedings, unilaterally and without consulting Mark,
Carolyn opted for a family policy during the 2004-2005 school year only (October,
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2004 - September, 2005) which cost her $556.59 per month out-of-pocket, the
increased cost of and about which she neither informed Mark nor attempted to have
him share, because he could have provided coverage through his employment much
less expensively; and that, as of October 1,2005, which was after the trial but more
than three months before entry of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, Carolyn's
out-of-pocket health insurance premium cost had gone from $556.59 per month to
$74.66 per month. See Mark's Supplement to His Motion for New Trial and attached
Exhibit A. R. p. 409, showing that, on Carolyn's pay stub (Exhibit A to R. p. 409) she
only contributes $74.66 per month, while the Weber County School District pays
$671.94 per month.
Mark relies on the case of State of Utah in Interest of J.P.. 921 P.2d 1012
(Utah App. 1996). JJL was a termination of parental rights case, in which, at trial,
numerous expert child psychologists, DCFS caseworkers, and others testified. Two
of the children involved were in the same foster home, but the foster parents did not
testify at trial and it was unclear whether they were interested in adopting the
children. 921 P.2d 1012, at 1015. The juvenile court denied the termination petition
eleven days after trial. That same day as the court entered its order, but before the
parties were notified of its decision, the State learned that the two young children's
foster parents were willing to adopt, and, accordingly, filed a Motion for a New Trial
or To Alter or Amend the Judgment pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, based upon newly discovered evidence (the exact Motion Mark filed in
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the present case). The juvenile court denied the State's motion, and the State
appealed.
Reversing the juvenile court, this court noted that in the unique setting of a
termination of parental rights proceeding and to determine a child's best interest, the
court needs continuing jurisdiction and must be free from Rule 59's strict
requirements, especially since juvenile court proceedings are equitable in nature.
921 P.2d 1012 at 1016. This court also concluded that the nature of juvenile court
proceedings affected the relaxation of strict adherence to Rule 59 standards,
because the State could simply refile the termination proceedings and allege the
new facts, holding that "Allowing a liberal application of Rule 59 seems a more
efficient remedy." 921 P.2d 1012, at 1018.
While perhaps not quite as highly equitable as juvenile court proceedings,
divorce cases are clearly equitable in nature. Iverson v. Iverson. 526 P.2d 1126
(Utah 1974) and it is submitted that the present case also presents unique
circumstances which allow for a more liberal interpretation of Ruie 59.
Newly discovered evidence, to qualify as a basis for a new trial or to alter or
amend the judgment, must be (1) material, competent evidence, which is in fact
newly discovered, and (2) it must be such that it could not by due diligence, have
been discovered and produced at trial. In re S.R.. 735 P.2d 53 (Utah 1987). This
court, in J.P.. given its unique circumstances, relaxed the implicit Rule 59
requirement that the newly discovered evidence must have been in existence at the
22

time of trial, in order to have been discoverable but not discovered by due diligence.
An analogous situation exists in the present case. For all the years of the parties'
marriage, Carolyn carried low cost health insurance coverage for the family. These
were the circumstances at separation and, so far as Mark could tell, during the entire
pendency of the proceedings, because he was unaware of the change in premium
amount (see Statement of Facts No. 24, this Brief).
Just as in J.P.. after trial, but months before the Judgment and Decree were
entered, Carolyn reduced greatly the family insurance premium, from $556.59 per
month to $74.66 per month. She had only had the excessively high premium for one
school year, out of the parties' twenty-seven (27) years of marriage. To require Mark
tofilea petition to modify under these circumstances does not serve the interests of
judicial economy, and amending the judgment by a reduction in Mark's alimony
obligation commensurate with the difference in the two premiums, is the appropriate
remedy on remand.
CONCLUSION
Utah trial courts have considerable discretion concerning property division in
divorce proceedings, and may consider all relevant circumstances, including, where
unique, separate and/or "nonmarital" property. Carolyn's Social Security benefits
involve just such a unique circumstance, having come out of marital earnings. The
better reasoned state decisions allow consideration of Social Security benefits in
fashioning a property division in a divorce, and Utah law is consistent with Judge
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Hadley's ruling, which should be affirmed.
Health insurance premium costs incurred by Carolyn for the parties' adult
children were included improperly by Judge Hadley in determining Carolyn's
personal reasonable monthly needs for alimony purposes. In addition, under the
special circumstances of this case, Carolyn reaped an alimony windfall by having,
for only one year out of twenty-seven years of marriage, an insurance premium of
$556.59 per month, which she had reduced to $74.66 per month more than three
months before the Judgment and Decree of Divorce was entered in this case. Judge
Hadley should have granted Mark's Rule 59 motion and reduced the alimony award
by the difference - $481.93. This court should remand for that purpose.
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5 U.S.C.A. § 8349

C
Effective: [See Text Amendments]
United States Code Annotated Currentness
Title 5. Government Organization and Employees (Refs & Annos)
Part III. Employees (Refs & Annos)
Subpart G. Insurance and Annuities (Refs & Annos)
*i Chapter 83. Retirement (Refs & Annos)
*n Subchapter HI. Civil Service Retirement (Refs & Annos)
-•§ 8349. Offset relating to certain benefits under the Social Security Act
(a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, if an individual under section 8402(b)(2) is entitled,
or would on proper application be entitled, to old-age insurance benefits under title II of the Social Security Act,
the annuity otherwise payable to such individual shall be reduced under this subsection.
(2) A reduction under this subsection commences beginning with the first month for which the individual both(A) is entitled to an annuity under this subchapter; and
(B) is entitled, or would on proper application be entitled, to old-age insurance benefits under title II of the
Social Security Act.
(3)(A)(i) Subject to clause (ii) and subparagraphs (B) and (C), the amount of a reduction under this subsection shall
be equal to the difference between-(I) the old-age insurance benefit which would be payable to the individual for the month referred to in paragraph
(2); and
(II) the old-age insurance benefit which would be so payable, excluding all wages derived from Federal service
of the individual, and assuming the individual were fully insured (as defined by section 214(a) of the Social
Security Act).
(ii) For purposes of this subsection, the amount of a benefit referred to in subclause (I) or (II) of clause (i) shall be
determined without regard to subsections (b) through (1) of section 203 of the Social Security Act, and without
regard to the requirement that an application for such benefit be filed.
(B) A reduction under this subsection—
(i) may not exceed an amount equal to the product of«
(I) the old-age insurance benefit to which the individual is entitled (or would on proper application be entitled)
for the month referred to in paragraph (2), determined without regard to subsections (b) through (1) of section
203 of the Social Security Act; and
(II) a fraction, as determined under section 8421(b)(3) with respect to the individual, except that the reference
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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to "service" in subparagraph (A) of such section shall be considered to mean Federal service, and
(ii) may not cause the annuity payment for an individual to be reduced below zero
(C) An amount computed under subclause (I) or (II) of subparagraph (A)(i), or under subparagraph (B)(i)(I), for
purposes of determining the amount of a reduction under this subsection shall be adjusted under section 8340 of
this title
(4) A reduction under this subsection applies with respect to the annuity otherwise payable to such individual under
this subchapter (other than under section 8337) for the month mvolved(A) based on service of such individual, and
(B) without regard to section 8345(j), if otherwise applicable
(5) The operation of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection shall not be considered for purposes of applying
the provisions of the second sentence of section 215(a)(7)(B)(i) or the provisions of section 215(d)(5)(ii) of the
Social Security Act in determining any amount under subclause (I) or (II) of paragraph (3)(A)(i) or paragraph
(3)(B)(i)(I) for purposes of this subsection
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter(A) a disability annuity to which an individual described in section 8402(b)(2) is entitled under this subchapter,
and
(B) a survivor annuity to which a person is entitled under this subchapter based on the service of an individual
described in section 8402(b)(2),
shall be subject to reduction under this subsection if that individual or person is also entitled (or would on proper
application also be entitled) to any similar benefits under title II of the Social Security Act based on the wages and
self-employment income of such individual described in section 8402(b)(2)
(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), reductions under this subsection shall be made in a manner consistent with the
manner in which reductions under subsection (a) are computed and otherwise made
(B) Reductions under this subsection shall be discontinued if, or for so long as, entitlement to the similar benefits
under title II of the Social Security Act (as referred to in paragraph (1)) is terminated (or, in the case of an
individual who has not made proper application therefor, woula be terminated;
(3) For the purpose of applying section 224 of the Social Security Act to the disability insurance benefit used to
compute the reduction under this subsection, the amount of the CSRS annuity considered shall be the amount of the
CSRS annuity before application of this section
(4) The Office shall prescribe regulations to carry out this subsection
(c) For the purpose of this section, the term Tederal service" means service which is employment for the purposes
of title II of the Social Security Act and chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by reason of the
amendments made by section 101 of the Social Security Amendments of 1983
(d) In administering subsections (a) through (c)~
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(1) the terms "an individual under section 8402(b)(2)" and "an individual described in section 8402(b)(2)" shall
each be considered to include any individual—
(A) who is subject to this subchapter as a result of any provision of law described in section 8347(o), and
(B) whose employment (as described in section 8347(o)) is also employment for purposes of title II of the
Social Security Act and chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and
(2) the term "Federal service", as applied with respect to any individual to whom this section applies as a result
of paragraph (1), means any employment referred to in paragraph (1)(B) performed after December 31, 1983.
CREDIT(S)
(Added Pub.L. 99-335, Title II, § 201(b)(1), June 6, 1986, 100 Stat. 589, and amended Pub.L. 99-514, § 2, Oct.
22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2095; Pub.L. 100-238, Title I, § 108(b)(2), Jan. 8, 1988, 101 Stat. 1748.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1986 Acts. House Conference Report No. 99-841 and Statement by President, see 1986 U.S. Code Cong, and
Adm. News, p. 4075.
Senate Report No. 99-166, House Conference Report No. 99-606, and Statement by President, see 1986 U.S. Code
Cong, and Adm. News, p. 1405.
1988 Acts. House Report No. 100-374 and Statement by President, see 1987 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p.
3217.
References in Text
The Social Security Act, referred to in subsecs. (a)(1), (2)(B), (b)(1), (2)(B), (c), and (d) is Act Aug. 14, 1935, c.
531, 49 Stat. 620, as amended. Title II of the Social Security Act is classified generally to subchapter II (section
401 et seq.) of chapter 7 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. For complete classification of this Act to the
Code, see section 1305 of Title 42 and Tables.
Section 214(a) of the Social Security Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(3)(A)(i)(II), is classified to section 414(a) of
Title 42.
Section 203 of the Social Security Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(3)(A)(ii) and (B)(i)(I), is classified to section 403
of Title 42.
Section 215(a)(7)(B)(i) and (d)(5)(ii), referred to in subsec. (a)(5), is classified to section 415 of Title 42.
Section 224 of the Social Security Act, referred to in subsec. (b)(3), is classified to section 424a of Title 42.
Chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsecs. (c) and (d)(1)(B), is classified to chapter
21 (section 3101 et seq.) of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
Section 101 of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, referred to in subsec. (c), is section 101 of Pub.L. 98-21,
which amended section 3121 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code, and sections 409 and 410 of Title 42, The Public
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Health and Welfare, and enacted provisions set out as notes under sections 3121 of Title 26 and 410 of Title 42.
Amendments
1988 Amendments. Subsec. (d). Pub.L. 100-238, § 108(b)(2), added subsec. (d).
1986 Amendments. Subsec. (c). Pub.L.99-514 substituted "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" for "Internal Revenue
Code of 1954".
Effective and Applicability Provisions
1988 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 100-238 effective Jan. 1, 1987, see section 108(b)(3) of Pub.L. 100-238, set out
as a note under section 8334 of this title.
1986 Acts. Section effective Jan. 1, 1987, see section 702(a) of Pub.L. 99- 335, set out as a note under section
8401 of this title.
Offsets To Prevent Full Double Coverage for Employees of Park Police and Secret Service
Provisions relating to offsets for the prevention of full double coverage for employees of the Park Police and the
Secret Service, see section 103(e) of Pub.L. 100-238, set out as a note under section 8334 of this title.
CROSS REFERENCES
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System annuity reduced consistent with this section,
see50USCA§2031.
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System annuity computed as if this section applied, see 22 USCA
§ 4046.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Officers and Public Employees kl01.5.
United States €=^39(15).
Key Number System Topic Nos. 283, 393.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Encyclopedias
Am. Jur. 2d Pensions and Retirement Funds § 1098, Offset Relating to Social Security Benefits.
5 U.S.C.A. § 8349, 5 USCA § 8349

Current through P.L. 109-482 (End) approved 01-15-07
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PV as of date

Payments
Commence

Payment

interest

Term

PV

Mark Olsen (No survivor benefit)

1-Mar-05

1-Apr-G5

5,214.19

4.60% 282 Months

897,804.70

Mark Olsen (Survivor benefits)

1-Mar-05

1-Apr-05

4,715.00
2.867.00

4.60% 282 Months
4.60% 150 Months

8S7.150.50

Mark Oisen (Share of survivor benefits)

1 -Mar-05

1-Apr-05

4.715.00

4.60% 282 Months

776.121.64

Carolyn Olsen (No survivor benefit)

1-Mar«G5

l-JuI-05

2.491.00

4.60% 358 Months

479,121.77

Carolyn Olsen (50% survivor benefit)

1-lWar-05

1-Jul-05

2,409.00
1.204.00

4.60% 358 Months
4.60% 74 Months

482,810.33

^ Carolyn Olsen (Share of 50% survivor benefit)

1 -Mar-05

1 -Jui-05

2,409.00

4.60% 358 Months

463.349.80

Carolyn Olsen (No survivor benefil)

1 -Mar-05

1-Jul-09

2.825.00

4.60% 316 Months

425.337.07

Carolyn Olsen (50% survivor benefit)

1-Mar-05

1-Jurt-09

2.715.00
1,357.00

4.60% 316 Months
4.60% 74 Months

430.211.01

Carolyn Olsen (Share of 50% survivor benefit)

1-Mar-05

1-Jul-09

2.715.00

4.60% 316 Months

408,775.27

Carolyn Olsen Social Security

1-Mar-05

1-May-19

1.647.00

4.60% 218 Months

127,323.06

PV as of date

Payments
Commence

Payment

Interest

Term

PV

Mark Olsen (No survivor benefit)

1-Mar-05

t-Apr-05

5,214.19

4.60% 282 Months

897,804.70

Carolyn OJsen (No survivor benefit)

1-Mar-05

1-Jul-05

2,491.00

4.60% 358 Months

479,121.77

Carolyn Olsen Social Security

1-Mar-05

1-May-19

1,647.00

4.60% 218 Months

127,323.06

Carolyn Olsen Social Security

1-Mar-05

1-May-19

1,647.00

4.60% 188 Months

115,435.24
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ROBERT L. NEELEY #2373
Attorney for Petitioner
2485 Grant Avenue
Suite 200
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: 801.621.3646
Fax: 801.621.3652
bobneelev@vahoo.com
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STA TE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY,

OGDENDEPARTMENT
oOo

CAROLYN A. OLSEN,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LA W

Petitioner,
vs.

:
Civil No. 034902377

MARK K. OLSEN,
Judge Scott M. Hadley
Mark Olsen.

:
Commissioner Douglas B. Thomas

Non-jury trial in the above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the
Honorable Scott M. Hadley, District Court Judge, on March 14, March 18, and April 4, 2005.
Petitioner, Carolyn A. Olsen and Respondent, Mark K. Olsen, were sworn and testified together
with witnesses Jason Stewart, Andy Bailey, Ken Thomson, Jean Hill, Cheryl Messerly, Brent
Griffiths, William Poulter, Kerry Olsen, Helen Brown, and Kevin Baumgard. The Court having
received exhibits from each of the parties; having reviewed the pleadings and affidavits on file;
and having heard the arguments and representations of counsel and being fully advised in the
matter, hereby makes the following:

Carolyn A. Olsen v. Mark K. Olsen
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 034902377
Page 2

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Carolyn Olsen and Mark Olsen are both actual and bona fide residents of Weber
County, State of Utah, and have been for more than tliree (3) months immediately prior to the
filing of this action for divorce.
2. Carolyn Olsen and Mark Olsen were married on May 5, 1978, in Eden, Weber
County, Utah, and have remained as wife and husband since that time.
3. Two (2) children have been born as issue of the parties' marriage, to-wit: Michael
Olsen, who is 21 years of age and emancipated, and Jesse Mark Olsen, born November 27, 1986.
Jesse is 18 years of age and will graduate from high school on June 3, 2005.
4. Carolyn Olsen is 52 years of age and was born on April 2, 1953.
5. Mark Olsen is 55 years of age and was born on October 30, 1949.
6. The parties separated on November 16, 2003, and have experienced irreconcilable
differences making the continuation of this marriage impossible.
7. Carolyn Olsen should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from Mark Olsen, the same to
become final upon entry.
8. The Court's previous Order of February 5, 2004, regarding custody of Jesse Olsen,
child support, and alimony shall continue in place through June 30, 2005, wherein Carolyn Olsen
is awarded base child support of $527.00 per month and alimony of $465.00 per month.
9. Both parties have available, through their respective places of employment, medical

Carolyn A. Olsen v. Mark K. Olsen
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 034902377
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24. Carolyn Olsen filed for divorce on December 11, 2003, and has occupied the marital
residence since separation.
25. Mark Olsen, after the separation, resided in the basement of a friend and later rented
a condominium.
26. The Court finds Mark Olsen does not reside with his friend, Cheryl Messerly, nor do
the parties share living expenses.
27. The Court finds the parties' 21 year old son, Michael, attends Utah State University
and comes home on holidays, some weekends, and when school is not in session.
28. The Court finds the parties5 18 year old son, Jesse Olsen, also intends to attend Utah
State University commencing fall semester of 2005 and will reside in Logan, Utah, during the
school year.
29. The Court finds the line of credit balance at the time the parties separated was
$57,300.00 and the balance at the time of trial was $45,923.00, representing an $11,442.00
reduction in principal.
30. The Court finds the parties' two children reside in the marital home in the summer
and also work in the area and reside with their mother when not in school. Carolyn Olsen would
like to be awarded the home as it is near her work and to provide a home for the children when
they are not attending college.
31. The Court finds the fair market value of the marital residence is $329,000.00

Carolyn A. Olsen v. Mark K. Olsen
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 034902377
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pursuant to an appraisal.
32. Mark Olsen would like to be awarded the home as he is capable of maintaining the
home having, for the most part, constructed the home.
33. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen has appropriately maintained the property since the
parties separation and has educated herself as to taking care of the property.
34. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen was allowed the use and benefit of her mother's two
(2) cabins located in Ogden Canyon during the parties' marriage. The parties were able to rent
the cabins and were entitled to receive the rental proceeds even though the deed to the cabins
remained in Carolyn Olsen's mother's name until 1998, when Helen Adams Brown conveyed, by
Quit Claim Deed, the two cabins to Carolyn Olsen.
35. The Court finds these cabins are presently rented occupied by two tenants and require
the typical landlord duties.
36. The Court finds the two cabins were owned by Carolyn Olsen's mother and father,
who occupied the same until approximately the mid 1950's when they moved and converted the
same to rental property.
37. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen's father passed away in the 1960!s and Carolyn
Olsen's mother owned the properties solely in her name thereafter.
38. The Court finds that in the 1970's the cabins became in disrepair.
39. The Court finds that Mark Olsen, with the consent of Carolyn Olsen's mother, was
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67. The Court finds that Mark Olsen's appraiser expressed an opinion there should be a
25 to 50% discount in the value of the property because the Olsens owned a fractionalized
interest in the property.
68. The Court finds the parties have essentially five (5) retirement plans. The Court finds
Carolyn Olsen has three (3) retirement plans: Social Security, a pension plan with the Utah State
Retirement System, and a 401(k) retirement plan with the Utah State Retirement System. Mark
Olsen has two retirement plans, a Thrift Savings Plan, a defined contribution plan together with a
pension plan designated as CSRS, Civilian Service Retirement System Plan.
69. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen intends to work at least five to ten more years as
a school teacher before retiring.
70. The Court finds that during the marriage Carolyn Olsen contributed to social security
and Mark Olsen did not.
71. The Court finds thai Carolyn Olsen has contributed, during the course of the
marriage, $53,196.00 to Social Security.
72. The Court finds that Brent Griffiths, CPA opined that if Carolyn Olsen lived to her
anticipated life expectancy, met all the requirements of social security, and assuming Carolyn
survived an additional 13 years until she was 65, the present value of her social security is
calculated to be $115,435.24. The Court finds that federal law prohibits any type of QDRO to
divide the monthly social security benefits of Carolyn Olsen.
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73. The Court finds that as to Carolyn Olsen's pension plan, a defined benefit plan, the
most equitable and least speculative way to divide the same between the parties is per the
Woodward formula wherein each party is awarded one-half (Vi) of the retirement benefits
acquired during the course of the marriage.
74. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen's 401(k) plan had a balance of $119,519.53 on
December 31, 2003, when Mark Olsen stopped contributing to his defined contribution plan
designated as a Thrift Savings Plan.
75. The Court finds that Mark Olsen's Thrift Savings Plan a defined contribution plan
had a balance of $93,639.00 on December 31, 2003.
76. The Court finds Mark Olsen has a defined benefit retirement plan designated as
CSRS (Civilian Service Retirement System) Plan and the most equitable way to divide the same
between the parties involving the least amount of speculation is to divide the retirement benefits
pursuant to the Woodward formula with Carolyn Olsen awarded one-half (54) of the retirement
benefits from May 5, 1978, date of marriage, until the parties' date of divorce.
77. The Court finds Mark Olsen's accumulated annual leave was a pre-marital asset as he
had accumulated 240 hours prior to the parties' marriage in May of 1978.
78. The Court finds there has been no augmentation or co-mingling of the annual leave
hours and therefore finds the value of Mark Olsen's annual sick leave is not a marital asset.
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101. The Court finds each party has incurred various debts and obligations since their
separation in November of 2003, and that each party should pay their own individual debts and
obligations incurred after the date of separation, holding the other party harmless therefrom.
102. The Court did not consider either party's retirement as a foreseeable event in
determining Carolyn Olsen's alimony award.
103. The Court continues the existing temporary award of alimony to Carolyn Olsen
through June of 2005, and the Court finds the permanent award of alimony should commence
July 1,2005.
104. The Court finds it should analyze the issue of whether Carolyn Olsen should be
awarded alimony based upon the traditional Jones v. Jones factors considering the needs of the
wife, her ability to contribute to her monthly needs, and finally, the husband's ability to pay.
105. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen has listed her monthly living expenses as set
forth in her Exhibit 1 at $45020.00. Mark Olsen objects to some of Carolyn Olscn's monthly
living expenses and the Court will address those individually. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen's
monthly living expenses other than those disputed by Mark Olsen are reasonable and the Court
approves those expenses.
106. The Court finds that as to Carolyn Olsen's monthly living expenses disputed by
Mark Olsen, the first disputed issue to be monthly medical and health insurance expense paid by
Carolyn Olsen in the sum of $556.59 per month, which is a payroll deduction through her place
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of employment with the Weber County School District.
107. Mark Olsen disputes that Carolyn Olsen should be permitted to insure the parties'
two adult children on her medical plan. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen has always maintained the
family medical insurance and insuring their children has become a part of the standard of living
of the parties.
108. The Court finds that both parties have available through their place of employment,
medical and health insurance for their children and that they have always maintained medical
insurance for their adult children, specifically Michael Olsen.
109. The Court finds that based upon the history of the parties and their past standard of
living, the Court approves $556.59 per month health insurance expense as a need of Carolyn
Olsen.
110. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen has deducted from her monthly gross income
$600.00 toward contribution to her 401k plan and $300.00 savings to her credit union and finds
that Carolyn Olsen has contributed, for many years, a total of $900.00 per month toward either
her retirement or savings. The Court finds the monthly contribution of Carolyn Olsen to her 401k
plan in the sum of $600.00 and savings to the credit union of $300.00 has become a standard of
living of the parties for many years and approves the same consistent with the Bakanowski case
cited by both parties. However, the Court will only allow one-half (V2), $450.00 as a necessary
monthly expense as Mark Olsen had an expectation to receive one-half (l/2) of Carolyn's
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become a part of the parties' standard of living. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen should be
allowed to claim $100.00 per month as part of her standard of living and will also allow Mark
Olsen to claim $100.00 per month as part of his standard of living.
118. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen5s total monthly living expenses necessary to
maintain the standard of living she has grown accustomed to during the parties' marriage is
$3,920.00; a deduction of $100.00 from her monthly expenses set forth in her Exhibit 1.
119. The Court finds that in regard to Carolyn Olsen's ability to contribute toward her
financial expenses each month, the Court considers Carolyn Olsen has a Bachelor's Degree,
together with a Master's Degree from Utah State University in Education and teaches 5th grade at
Valley Elementary in Huntsville, Utah. Her contract for the school year 2004-2005 pays
$48,491.00 gross per annum, plus career ladder pay.
120. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen has a monthly gross income of $4,865.00 which
includes $625.00 per month rental income from the cabins and career ladder income.
121. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen's net monthly income to be $3,058.00.
122. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen is employed full time as a school teacher. School
teachers typically engage in continuing education during the summer and preparing for the school
year. In addition, Carolyn Olsen has to maintain the cabins which can be best accomplished
during the summer months.
123. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen's unmet monthly financial shortfall is $862.00,
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living expenses of $3,920.00 less $3,058.00 net income.
124. The Court finds Mark Olsen's annual gross income is $104,987.00, which is
equivalent of $8,749.00 per month gross income.
125. The Court finds Mark Olsen's monthly net income to be $5,390.00 allowing for
deductions he set out in his Exhibit 6.
126. The Court finds that Mark Olsen should be allowed to contribute an additional
$125.00 per month to his savings to equalize the expense allowed to Carolyn Olsen. Thus, Mark
Olsen has a monthly net income, for marital purposes, of $5,265.00.
127. The Court finds that as to Mark Olsen's monthly financial needs, his reasonable
housing allowance is $1,403.00 which includes mortgage payment, taxes, insurance, and
maintenance.
128. The Court finds Mark Olsen's monthly utility expense should be the same as
Carolyn Okeii's of $486.00 per month.
129. The Court finds Mark Olsen's food and household supplies to be $500.00 per
month, the same as Carolyn Olsen.
130. The Court finds Mark Olsen's personal monthly living expenses to be $644.00 to
include clothing, medical, dental, recreation, grooming, travel and vacations, and laundry.
131. The Court finds Mark Olsen's monthly transportation expense to be $600.00 per
month which includes gas, oil, maintenance of automobile, license and insurance and $300.00 as

